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The convertible security' has long been known in the United States
as a useful financing device 2 which the issuing corporation can sell
at a higher price than nonconvertible securities because it gives the
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1 Throughout this article the term "convertible security" will be used to include,
unless the context indicates otherwise, bonds, debentures and preferred shares which
are entitled to conversion into the issuing company's common stock at the option of the
holder. The common stock deliverable upon exercise of the right of conversion will be
referred to as the "underlying security."
2 Convertible securities can, of course, have different characteristics. Securities can
be convertible at the option of the issuer or upon the occurrence of certain events.
The right of conversion can exist for the life of the convertible security or for shorter
periods, either stipulated or contingent in length. The rate of conversion or the number
of underlying securities deliverable upon exercise of conversion can be made variable
either by the passage of time or by other contingencies. The convertible security may
grant a right to convert into securities other than common stock or securities other than
those issued by its original issuer, e.g., into securities of a subsidiary or of another com-
pany which has either granted the right of conversion or posted securities in escrow
deliverable against conversion.
The device's flexibility may even permit upward conversion although the issuing
company will probably be unable to effect upward conversion into debt securities unless
it has the capital structure and required surplus which would allow it to buy common
shares for cash. For example, preferred stock may be made convertible into common
stock and also into debt securities. Upward conversion alone from common stock into
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purchaser the advantages of a prior claim on assets and earnings plus
the option to convert his investment into common stock.3 For the right
of conversion to be meaningful, the investor must be assured either
that the amount and character of the security received upon conversion
will remain stable or that adjustments will be made to protect his in-
vestment should the attributes of this underlying security be changed.
To protect the convertible shareholder's interest against such changes
in the underlying securities, "anti-dilution" clauses are generally in-
cluded as a matter of course in modem convertible securities or in the
charter or indenture creating them.4 In the absence of specific provi-
a class A common or a junior preferred stock has also been used where the latter is being
sold to the public while the remaining common shares are held by the original stock-
holders. The financial position of the shares sold to the public is often buttressed by re-
stricting dividends on the common shares for a stipulated period of time and by limiting
the common shares' right of conversion into a parity position in accordance with a formula
based either on time or demonstrated earnings. Another type of upward conversion was
recently offered to holders of common shares in a large publicly held company. A pro-
portion of its common was exchanged for newly created convertible preferred, convertible
back into common; this enabled the company to create a widely held convertible
preferred stock which could be used for purposes of corporate acquisition.
3 The convertible security probably attained its greatest popularity in this country
following World War II when the changing value of the dollar and the concomitant fear of
inflation made fixed-dollar securities generally less attractive. At the same time the flotation
in increasing amounts of securities of new companies with relatively small equity cushions
made a prior position, coupled with an option to acquire equity, a desirable if not
essential sales feature. JENNINGS & MARSH, CASES ON SECuRrrIES REGULATION 371 (1963).
In some instances the fear of inflation was combatted by providing that evidences of in-
debtedness would be payable in amounts of currency which would be adjustable upwards
in accordance with a cost-of-living index. A parallel movement in the insurance field even-
tuated in the variable alnuity, which seeks to provide upward adjustment by a combina-
tion of common stock investment and insurance and by the varying of annuity payments
in accordance with stock performance. On the business aspects of using convertible
securities in the raising of capital, see generally PILCER, RAISING CAPITAL WITH CONVERT-
sBLE SECURrTIEs (1961). See also DEwING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 256-75 (5th
ed. 1953).
The convertible security is relatively new as an important financing device in the
European market. See R. Jones, Hoogovens to Pechiney, Barron's Nat'l Bus. & Financial
Weekly, March 1, 1965, p. 5, col. 1, setting forth examples of convertible bond issues in
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Holland, Italy and Belgium. The writer
comments:
The combination of fixed-interest security with a future call on the equity
seems ideally suited to the present state of European capital markets. . . . It
apparently is the answer to the dilemma of conservative Continental savers who
find the interest rates attractive but traditionally shy away from equities. At the
same time, stock market investors, made cautious by four years of profitless infla-
tion, now can obtain position in blue-chips with some limit on the downside
risk. Finally, the issuing companies are able to raise large sums at relatively
reasonable interest costs, with a good chance of broadening their equity base
without excessive dilution. Id. at p. 5, cols. 2-3.
See also The Convertible Bond Comes to Belgium, 17 WEimuy BULLETIN OF THE KREDIET-
BANK OF BRUSSELS 261 (1962).
4 Loss suggests that in practice an anti-dilution provision has become necessary to the
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sions to protect against dilution, there is a great probability that narrow
and literal interpretation of the contractual right to convert would
limit the right to precisely what was specified, without adjustment for
subsequent substantial changes in the attributes of the underlying
security.5
All too often, however, the anti-dilution clause has been viewed by
attorneys and investment bankers as "boilerplate," a standard provision
not subject to, or worthy of, negotiation. For instance, the usual pros-
pectus describing securities for sale in a public offering registered under
the Securities Act of 1933 contains language referring to the anti-
dilution clause in substantially the following nebulous terms: "The
securities contain provisions for adjustments in the right of conversion
upon the occurrence of certain contingencies." 6 I have seen attorneys
prepare convertible securities by cutting anti-dilution clauses from
instruments of other companies and pasting them into the instruments
being prepared, changing only the number of shares involved and the
name of the securities to be issued. In many instances the issuer's
attorney ignores the fact that clauses taken from other instruments may
have been carefully designed to protect the senior security's right of
conversion and by using these clauses concedes many legitimate argu-
ments which could be made for conversion provisions more favorable
to the holders of underlying securities. 7
Customary anti-dilution clauses are long and complex, presenting
intricate problems of draftsmanship which may often deter penetrating
examination. But the frequent failure to consider anti-dilution clauses
marketing of convertible securities: "Indeed, the preferred [in Park & Tilford, Inc. v.
Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947)] was not even genuinely
convertible, in the sense that the convertibility privilege was not protected against dilu-
tion of the common through stock dividends or splits." 2 Loss, SEculUrms REGULATION
1067 (2d ed. 1961).
6 See Parkinson v. West End Street Ry., 173 Mass. 446, 53 N.E. 891 (1899).
6 A typical prospectus issued in 1962 described conversion rights in toto as follows:
Conversion Rights
The Debentures are convertible at the option of the holders at any time after
January 1, 1963, and to and including July 15, 1972, into Common Stock of the
Company at the conversion prices set forth on the cover page of this prospectus.
The conversion prices are subject to adjustment in certain events to prevent dilu-
tion. Upon conversion, no adjustment will be made for interest or dividends.
Fractions of shares resulting from conversion will be paid in cash. Conversion
rights of Debentures called for redemption expire at the close of business on
redemption date.
Copy on file in The University of Chicago Law Review office.
7 The interests of the holders of a convertible security will in many respects necessarily
be in direct opposition to those of the holders of the underlying securities. Every advantage
granted to the convertible security holders through the anti-dilution clause diminishes the
interests of the holders of underlying securities; conversely, any failure of the anti-dilution
clause to protect against diminution of the value of the conversion privilege will dilute
the value of the senior securities.
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for possible disadvantages to the convertible security holders and con-
versely for their effects on the underlying security holders means that
bargains are often made upon uninformed assumptions.8 Draftsmen of
anti-dilution clauses should be cognizant of the different solutions which
are available and of the significant variations in the rights of the con-
vertible security holder which result. They should not assume that pro-
tection against dilution is too complex a problem to bear re-examina-
tion or that the anti-dilution clauses must be so neutral that they benefit
neither the convertible security holder nor the common shareholder.9
I. ANTI-DILUTION CLAUSES IN OPERATION
To draft an anti-dilution clause the lawyer must determine the degree
of protection the investor seeks in a number of recurrent situations:
share splits or combinations, ° sales of common stock below the specified
8 It should be noted that anti-dilution clauses may also be employed in stock warrants,
stock rights, and options to purchase stock. However, the elaborate clauses which are
standard in convertible securities are seldom used in other instruments. The stock right,
which usually lasts for only two or three weeks, may not even contain any anti-dilution
provision because of the improbability of change within such a short period of time; in
a random group of stock rights there was no anti-dilution provision. The long-term
warrant to purchase stock, on the other hand, usually contains some provision protecting
against dilution. A random group of stock purchase warrants handled the situation by
various devices such as: (a) the issuance of the warrants pursuant to, and incorporating by
reference, a Warrant Agency Agreement which contains a full anti-dilution clause similar
to a debenture indenture; (b) a reference on the facing sheet of the warrant indicating
that the number of kinds of securities deliverable or the exercise price may be altered
pursuant to conditions stated on the reverse side of the warrant; and (c) an abbreviated
generalized anti-dilution clause. A long-term stock option also generally contains an
anti-dilution clause, which may vary from the general provision used in stock warrants to
the elaborate standard anti-dilution clause depending upon the length of time for which
and the person to whom the option is granted. An agreement to purchase stock for
delivery at a future date may contain a provision that there will be no change in the
capital structure of the company in the interim when the stock is purchased directly
from the issuer or a short general anti-dilution clause when it is purchased from someone
who is not in control of the corporation. But often such an instrument does not deal with
this contingency at all, in which case the purchaser takes a serious risk that the nature of
the stock or of the corporate structure of the issuer will change during the interval be-
tween the date of his contract and the date of actual delivery.
9 See, for pioneering work in this area, BERLE, STUDY IN THE LAw OF CORPORATION
FINANCE ch. VII (1928). The most comprehensive treatment of convertible securities and
of anti-dilution clauses in the legal periodicals is Hills, Convertible Securities-Legal
Aspects in Draftsmanship, 19 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1930). A shorter but excellent consideration
of convertibility is contained in Buxbaum, Preferred Stock-Law and Draftsmanship, 42
CALIF. L. Rav. 243 (1954). See also GRAHAI, DODD & COTTLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS 615-19
(4th ed. 1962); Fleisher & Cary, Taxation of Convertible Bonds and Stock, 74 HARV. L. REV.
473 (1961); Irvine, Some Comments Regarding "Anti-dilution" Provisions Applicable to
Convertible Securities, 13 Bus. LAw. 729 (1958); Keith, Convertible Securities and Stock
Purchase Warrants, 2 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 16 (1929).
10 All anti-dilution clauses provide for appropriate and obvious adjustments to take
account of splits and combinations of the underlying shares.
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conversion price, distributions of stock dividends, extraordinary divi-
dends in cash or kind, issuance of options, and corporate mergers or
consolidations. The lawyer must also deal with the problem of
whether the conversion price should escalate at specific intervals as an
inducement for conversion and the possibility of the corporation's
evasion of the anti-dilution provisions.
These problems would be easier to handle if there were an under-
lying theory for the clause. However, it is difficult to formulate a theory
and to reconcile the provisions of many clauses with any single theory.
A generally accepted description of the purposes of the clause might be
the following: "The purpose of anti-dilution provisions is, of course,
to provide for adjustment in the amount of securities to be issued
upon conversion of a convertible security ... in order to compensate
for certain changes affecting the security ... into which it is converti-
ble."' ' Such a definition does not, however, give any indication of
which "changes affecting the security" should trigger an adjustment,
nor does it indicate the nature of the adjustment which such changes
should occasion. Stating that the objective of the clause is to protect
the right of conversion is even less helpful since it does not identify
the theory of the clause or the threats against which it is to guard the
convertible security holder. Another way of defining the fundamental
theory of the anti-dilution clause is to say that it is drawn to protect
against any change in the exchange ratio, that is, to insure that the
percentage of the total number of underlying shares deliverable on
exercise of the right of conversion will remain unchanged, despite al-
terations in the corporate structure, except as otherwise provided in the
anti-dilution clause. Another possible theory is that it protects against
a change in the value of the securities deliverable upon exercise of
conversion. This is undoubtedly too broad and comprehensive a state-
ment of purpose, because there are doubtless many events and oc-
currences of a business or economic nature which may materially and
adversely affect the value of the underlying security which do not cause
an adjustment of the conversion price.12 It is also possible to contend
that one of the purposes of the anti-dilution clause is to protect the
market value of the underlying security against a decline arising from
modification of the corporation's capital structure. Though a portion
of the customary anti-dilution clause can seemingly be explained only
by such a theory, that theory will not provide explanation or justifica-
11 Irvine, supra note 9, at 729.
12 Furthermore, this theory fails to jibe with the fact that the conversion privilege
enhances the value of the senior security by permitting the senior security holder to
share in the growth of the corporation by converting to the junior security.
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tion for the bulk of the contents of a customary anti-dilution clause.
Of the several theories described above it is probable that the protec-
tion of the exchange ratio, in a broad and loose sense, is the most likely
general underlying basis for the customary anti-dilution clause, al-
though some specific provisions of the customary clause may well be
difficult to reconcile with such a theory. Possibly a cumulation of these
suggested explanatory theories may underlie the clause, with the holder
of the convertible security getting the benefit of any protective pro-
visions suggested by any or all of the several theories.' 3
A. Sale of Common Stock Below the Specified Conversion Price
The conversion price is the agreed upon price at which each share
of the underlying security is to be obtained upon conversion. If new
shares of the underlying security are issued at a price less than the
conversion price14 and if no adjustment is made in the rights of the
convertible security holder, the value of shares obtained upon conver-
sion will be diluted.
Three of the four types of anti-dilution clauses adopt the same funda-
mental approach to the problem; these three clauses are here termed
"traditional" or "customary." The last type of clause is a new and
radical challenger, departing sharply from the others in this regard.
The earlier anti-dilution clauses often provided that the number of
underlying shares deliverable upon conversion would be protected
against dilution by a direct adjustment of the number of shares deliver-
able. If the arrangement were to deliver one share of common stock
upon conversion of. one share of the convertible security, the ratio
would be one to one, and the early adjustment provisions would have
specified a direct change in that ratio. Although the effect remains
fundamentally the same, current anti-dilution clauses achieve their
results by a method which is slightly indirect but which is simpler in
operation. Current clauses provide that the conversion shall be made
at a rate determined by a conversion price and that any variations in
the conversion price caused by operation of the anti-dilution clause
will in turn vary the number of underlying shares deliverable upon
conversion. Thus, if the basic arrangement was to deliver one share
13 The purpose of the traditional anti-dilution clause may be obscured because the
clause has grown by what Mr. Justice Cardozo called the "agglutinative" process, in
which each newly drafted clause not only reproduces the last available previous form
but also includes a new provision to deal with any additional contingency which has
occurred to the draftsman.
14 This may take place by stock dividend (which is an issuance of shares without
consideration), public sale or private placement of underlying shares at a price below
conversion price, issuance of underlying shares for property worth less than the conver-
sion price, or an offering to shareholders below the conversion price.
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of common stock upon conversion of one share of preferred stock and if
the original conversion price was $100, then a five for one common
stock split will cause the new conversion price to drop to $20 and five
common shares will be deliverable upon conversion of one share of the
preferred stock. This change in the conversion price is a computation
device designed only to facilitate determining the number of under-
lying shares deliverable upon conversion. It is, however, in such general
use that the "conversion price" method has practically supplanted the
older "conversion rate" method and is the central characteristic of the
traditional anti-dilution clause mechanism.
The first type of anti-dilution clause reduces the conversion price to
the lowest level at which the issuer sold the underlying stock in any sale
not specially excluded from consideration. 5 This is the most favorable
clause for the convertible security holder and the harshest clause for
the junior security holder. It deprives the issuing corporation of neces-
sary flexibility in its financial affairs and is probably obsolete at present,
since it could only be achieved or imposed by an unusually dominant
investor.
A second traditional type of anti-dilution clause deals with the sale
of underlying shares at a price below the original conversion price by
reducing the conversion price to the weighted average of the price of
any underlying securities sold below the conversion price and the con-
version price then in effect. This clause, however, does not allow any
adjustment upward in the event of the sale of underlying securities at
a price in excess of the original or the current conversion price. For
convenience, this type of anti-dilution clause, which until recently was
the most popular, will be characterized as the "downward conversion
price clause." The pertinent portion of a typical downward conversion
price clause provides:
. .. In case the Company shall at any time or from time to time
after May 31, 1954 issue or sell any of its Common Shares
15 Most anti-dilution clauses permit certain kinds of issuances of underlying stock
without adjustment of the shares deliverable upon conversion. Presumably these trans-
actions are exempted because they are either inherently beneficial to the enterprise or
else because their exemption is specifically negotiated and bargained for. Alternatively,
it his been suggested that the purchaser of the convertible security takes the situation
as he finds it with the exceptions representing potential risks of dilution he has already
assumed. The exclusions most frequently found are (1) shares deliverable against restricted
stock options (usually with a maximum number specified), (2) treasury shares (sometimes
limited to shares to be acquired for the treasury in the future and not extending the
exemption to treasury shares already held), (3) shares deliverable upon conversion of the
outstanding convertible securities, (4) shares in a prescribed amount which may be issued
in a single underwriting or private placement for a specific purpose, and (5), stock divi-
dends of a specified character or amount.
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... for a consideration per share less than the conversion price
in effect immediately prior to the time of such issue or sale,
said conversion price then in effect and the conversion price or
prices then applicable for any subsequent period or periods
shall be adjusted ... to a price (calculated to the nearest cent)
determined by dividing (i) an amount equal to the sum of (x)
the number of Common Shares outstanding immediately prior
to such issue or sale multiplied by the then existing conversion
price, and (y) the consideration, if any, received by the
Company upon such issues or sale by (ii) the total number
of Common Shares outstanding immediately after such issue
or sale.16
The downward conversion price clause was generally popular in the
financings of the 1920's and 1930's but after World War II, when there
was a great expansion of financing through convertible securities, many
issuers argued that if the holders of underlying securities were to be
penalized by a reduction in the conversion price when the issuer sold
underlying securities below the conversion price, some equivalent
allowance should be made when the issuer sold underlying securities
at a price in excess of the conversion price. These contentions revolved
about the drafting of anti-dilution clauses which provided for an off-
setting adjustment of the conversion price to reflect sales of underlying
securities at prices above the then effective conversion price, but with
a ceiling on the upward adjustment fixed at the initial conversion
price.' For example, an initial conversion price of $10 would be un-
affected by a subsequent sale of securities at $12 per share, but if the
initial conversion price had been lowered by subsequent sales below
$10, another sale at $12 would raise the conversion price, but not over
the original conversion price of $10. In most clauses of this "two-way
16 The provision has been reproduced from an actual instrument, with only irrelevant
and identifying matter deleted. Copy on file at The University of Chicago Law Review
office. Other illustrations of clauses and provisions will be similarly set forth throughout
this article. The following is an example of a computation in accordance with this type
of provision:
If P is the conversion price, X is the number of shares outstanding prior to the new
issuance, N is the number of new shares to be issued and Y is the consideration for which
they are to be issued, then CP, the new conversion jrice, can be found by the following
PX + NY
formula: X + N = CP. Translated into numbers, if P is $10, 1000 shares are outstand-
ing, and an additional 1000 shares are to be issued at $5, the formula would read as
follows:
10 X 1000 + 5 X 1000 10 $7.50, the new conversion price.
1000 + 1000
17 It might be argued that the ceiling of the initial conversion price should not be
imposed; however, I have never seen an anti-dilution clause which contained a different
ceiling figure.
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conversion price" type, whether the decrease in conversion price will be
offset by increases in the value of underlying shares due to sales above
the conversion price depends upon whether the sales above the con-
version price precede the sales below the conversion price. However,
there is no reason why the downward adjustment in conversion price
should not be offset in the event of a sale of underlying shares above
the current conversion price regardless of when that sale occurred.
The anti-dilution clause providing for upward adjustment is some-
times called the "current quotient formula," but might better be re-
ferred to as the "two-way conversion price clause."'" An example of
this type of clause is as follows:
(1) In case the conversion price in effect immediately prior
to the close of business on any day shall exceed by 50 cents or
more the amount determined at the close of business on such
day by dividing:
(i) a sum equal to (a) (x) (being the total number of
shares of Common Stock outstanding at the date of this In-
denture) multiplied by $(y) (being the initial conversion
price), plus (b) the aggregate of the amounts of all considera-
tion received by the Company upon the issuance of Additional
Shares of Common Stock (as hereinafter defined), minus (c) the
aggregate of the amounts of all dividends and other distribu-
tions which shall have been paid or made after the date of
this Indenture on Common Stock of the Company, other
than in cash out of its earned surplus or in Common Stock of
the Company, by
(ii) the sum of (a) (z) (being the total number of shares
of Common Stock outstanding at the date of this Indenture)
and (b) the number of Additional Shares of Common Stock
which shall have been issued, the conversion price shall be
18 The current quotient formula is described in Irvine, Some Comments Regarding
"Anti-dilution" Provisions Applicable to Convertible Securities, 13 Bus. LAw. 729, 730
(1958):
Under the formula in its simplest form, the current quotient is the decimal
AB + C
equivalent of a fraction which may be expressed as T- where A is the num-
ber of shares outstanding at the time of issuance of the convertible debentures,
B is the initial conversion price, C is the aggregate consideration received for all
additional shares of common stock issued subsequent to the issuance of the
debentures, and D is the total number of such additional shares. If the conver-
sion price in effect at the close of business on any day exceeds the current
quotient determined immediately after the close of business on each day, the
conversion price is reduced to the current quotient so determined, the adjustment
being effective as of the opening of business on the next succeeding day.
The argument for the right to average in sales above conversion price as well as those
below it appears to have carried the day; it well may be that the downward conversion
price formula has been largely superseded by the current quotient and may soon be re-
placed by a genuine two-way adjustment conversion price formula.
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reduced, effective immediately prior to the opening of busi-
ness on the next succeeding day, by an amount equal to the
largest integral multiple of 50 cents contained in the amount
by which such conversion price shall exceed the amount so
determined.' 9
It should be noted that this clause provides only for reduction in price.
Thus, if the conversion price has been reduced, a subsequent sale will
not raise it. If, however, there has been a sale at a price above the initial
conversion price, that sale will tend to offset a subsequent sale below
the initial conversion price.
A small number of investment bankers have recently given currency
to a radically different type of anti-dilution clause, denominated a
"market price" clause. Although this type of clause was used, I have
been informed, as far back as the 1920's, it has only recently received
wider application.20 It is primarily distinguished from the traditional
conversion price clauses in that it adjusts the conversion price in con-
nection with the sale of underlying shares by the issuing company
only when such sale is made to the company's common shareholders
in a rights offering at a price below the then current market price for
such shares, without regard for the conversion price.21
19 A fully flexible two-way adjustment formula follows: If P is the initial conversion
price, 0 is the number of shares outstanding at the time of the issuance of the convertible
securities, C is the aggregate consideration received for all additional shares of underlying
securities issued subsequent to the issuance of the convertible securities and A is the total
number of such additional shares, CP (the new conversion price) can be ascertained by the
following formula:
= (0 XP) +C
O+A
Translated into numerical terms in a simple example, if the initial conversion price was
$10 and 1000 shares were outstanding at the time of the issuance of convertible securities
and if two additional issues of new shares in the amount of 500 shares each at prices of
$5 and $15 respectively had been made, then the new conversion price would be ascer-
tained (whether it raises or lowers the current price) as follows:
10 X 1000 + 5 X 500 + 15 X 500
1000 + 1000 = $10,
which is the newest conversion price.
20 It is to be found in the securities issues underwritten by Goldman, Sachs 9- Co.
and Kidder Peabody & Co.; it is also used by Equitable Life Assurance Society.
21 An adherent of the market price form of anti-dilution provision stated in a letter
to me the theories for the market price and the conversion price forms as follows:
"Market Price." An adjustment based upon sales below the market price
(whether above or below the conversion price) is designed to protect the current
market value of the conversion privilege as it exists from time to time.
"Conversion Price." An adjustment based upon sales below the conversion price
is designed to preserve the intrinsic value of the conversion privilege as it existed
at the time of the issuance of the convertible security, determined on the assump-
tion that the underlying security had at that time a potential value at least equal
to the original conversion price.
Letter on file in The University of Chicago Law Review office. He then proceeded to
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B. Stock Dividends
Stock dividends have presented a thorny problem for drafters and
interpreters of anti-dilution clauses. If a stock dividend amounts to
a substantial percentage of the outstanding shares it is probably a
means of splitting the stock and is generally treated as an issuance of
stock without consideration requiring an appropriate downward ad-
justment of the conversion price. If, however, the stock dividend
supplements or substitutes for the issuing company's cash dividends,
there is often great uncertainty as to the proper application of anti-
dilution clauses, which do not expressly deal with the problem. The dis-
pute over the treatment of stock dividends involves a conflict between
economic realities and the literal terms of the anti-dilution clause.
For example, a corporation might announce that it will conserve
cash for internal development by substituting stock dividends of $5
market value for its $5 annual cash dividend. The stock dividend
obviously increases the number of outstanding shares without raising
any money for the corporation. Over a period of years these periodic
distributions could be the equivalent of a single 50% stock dividend
which would require an appropriate adjustment in the amount of
securities deliverable upon conversion. However, it can be argued
that since the stock dividend is only a substitute for a cash dividend
which would not affect the conversion ratio, the stock dividends also
should not require an adjustment of the conversion ratio. Moreover,
the corporation could issue the stock dividends without any adjust-
ment of the conversion ratio by paying the $5 cash dividend and then
selling its shareholders stock in an amount equal to the cash dividend
declared. Although in the absence of a specific provision dealing with
this question the parties will usually agree to adjust the conversion
ratios if the stock dividend is large, it is becoming common to include
specific provisions which exempt from the operation of the anti-dilu-
tion clause those dividends which are merely substitutes for cash
dividends. Perhaps a more specific and safer provision would require,
as a condition for exemption, that the company's cash dividends shall
be at or below an agreed level per annum instead of merely setting
a maximum limit upon stock dividends which shall not affect the
conversion price and stipulating that the stock dividend be issued in
describe an additional kind of anti-dilution clause which combines both the market price
and the conversion price form of clause, the theory of which he described as follows:
"'Combination of Market Price and Conversion Price. A provision combining the con-
version price and market price clauses to provide whichever adjustment shall be the
greater is designed to protect both the current market value of the conversion privilege
and its original intrinsic value."
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substitution for cash distributions. This would more clearly preclude
the issuer from doubling its distribution by giving both cash and stock
dividends.22
C. "Capital" Distributions
Controlled events or capital rearrangements voluntarily and deliber-
ately effected by management may properly warrant "semi-punitive"
downward adjustment of the conversion price. Suppose that the com-
pany increases its cash dividend policy on underlying shares from its
long standing practice of a 5% annual dividend to 10% per annum.
Or suppose the company decides to distribute its surplus among holders
of its underlying shares by making an extraordinary cash distribution
equivalent to ten or twenty times its customary annual dividend. Or
suppose the issuing company declares a partial liquidating dividend.
Should such events trigger an adjustment of conversion price? Because
they would affect the market value of the shares and the worth of the
conversion privilege, they should probably be specially provided for
as events causing readjustment of conversion price. Occasionally anti-
dilution clauses provide for adjustment upon such events.23 Other
22 The treatment of stock dividends for the purposes of anti-dilution clauses raises
problems similar to those met when such dividends are allocated between income and
principal or between life tenant and remainderman for trust administration purposes.
There has been very little theoretical consideration of whether "regular" dividends declared
in stock should be treated as income or principal, or may be allocated partly to one and
partly to the other. See 2 ScoTT, TRUsrs § 236.7 (1939). Extraordinary stock dividends
have been treated differently and irreconcilably in many jurisdictions. See id. at § 236.5.
But under § 5(l) of the widely adopted Uniform Principal and Income Act all dividends
payable in shares of the corporation are to be deemed principal. By analogy, all dividends
in stock should be regarded as dilution and should therefore occasion modification of the
conversion price. Hence, if it is desired to prevent such modification should regular stock
dividends be declared in lieu of cash dividends, the burden should properly be upon the
drafter of the anti-dilution clause to make an express provision to that effect.
23 A typical provision of this type reads as follows:
Other Dividends and Distributions, Except Certain Warrants or Other Rights
or Convertible Securities. In case after the date hereof the Company shall take
a record of the holders of its Common Stock for the purpose of entitling them
to receive any dividend or other distribution of
(1) cash (other than a cash distribution made as a dividend and payable out of
earnings or earned surplus legally available for the payment of dividends under
the laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation of the Company, to the extent, but
only to the extent, that the aggregate of all such cash dividends paid or declared
after the date hereof does not exceed the net income of the Company earned
subsequent to the date hereof, determined in accordance with sound accounting
practice), or
(2) any evidences of its indebtedness (other than Convertible Securities), any
shares of its stock (other than Additional Shares of Common Stock) or any other
securities or property of any nature whatsoever (other than cash), or(3) any warrants or other rights to subscribe for or purchase any evidences of
its indebtedness (other than Convertible Securities), any shares of its stock (other
than Additional Shares of Common Stock) or any other securities or property of
any nature whatsoever,
then the number of shares of Common Stock thereafter comprising a Stock Unit
shall be adjusted to that number determined by multiplying the number of shares
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clauses provide that upon the extraordinary events described therein,
which would include an unusual cash dividend or a dividend in kind,
the holders of convertible securities shall be entitled to receive appro-
priate notice-possibly thirty to sixty days--of the proposed dividend
or other prescribed event, so that they may convert and thereby receive
the benefit of such distribution. If they fail to convert, the distribution
is permitted to be made without any adjustment in the conversion
price.24 The rationale of such a notice provision is that the convertible
of Common Stock comprising a Stock Unit immediately prior to such adjustment
by a fraction (i) the numerator of which shall be the Current Market Price per
share of Common Stock at the date of taking such record, and (ii) the denominator
of which shall be such Current Market Price per share less the portion applicable
to one share of Common Stock of any such cash so distributable and of the fair
value (as determined in good faith by the Board of Directors of the Company) of
any and all such evidences of indebtedness, shares of stock, other securities or
property, or warrants or other subscription or purchase rights, so distributable.
A reclassification of the Common Stock into shares of Common Stock and shares
of any other class of stock shall be deemed a distribution by the Company to the
holders of its Common Stock of such shares of such other class of stock within the
meaning of this Subsection and, if the outstanding shares of Common Stock shall
be changed into a larger or smaller number of shares of Common Stock as a part
of such reclassification, shall be deemed a subdivision or combination, as the case
may be, of the outstanding shares of Common Stock within the meaning of Sub-
section A of this Section.
Copy on file in The University of Chicago Law Review office.
24 The following is a typical "notice" provision:
Notice of Certain Corporate Action. In case the Company shall propose (a) to
pay any dividend payable in stock of any class to the holders of its Common Stock
or to make any other distribution to the holders of its Common Stock (other than
a cash dividend payable out of earnings or earned surplus legally available for the
payment of dividends under the laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation of the
Company, to the extent, but only to the extent, that the aggregate of all such
cash dividends paid or declared after the date hereof does not exceed the net in-
come of the Company earned subsequent to the date hereof, determined in ac-
cordance with sound accounting practice), or (b) to offer to the holders of its
Common Stock rights to subscribe for or to purchase any Additional Shares of
Common Stock or shares of stock of any class or any other securities, rights or
options, or (c) to effect any reclassification of its Common Stock (other than a
reclassification involving only the subdivision or combination of outstanding shares
of Common Stock), or (d) to effect any capital reorganization, or (e) to effect any
consolidation, merger or sale, transfer or other disposition of all or substantially
all of its property, assets or business, or (f) to effect the liquidation, dissolution or
winding up of the Company, then, in each such case, the Company shall deliver
to the Warrant Agent notice of such proposed action, which shall specify the date
on which a record is to be taken for the purposes of such stock dividend, distribu-
tion of rights, or the date on which such reclassification, reorganization, consolida-
tion, merger, sale, transfer, disposition, liquidation, dissolution, or winding up
is to take place and the date of participation therein by the holders of Common
Stock, if any such date is to be fixed, and shall also set forth such facts with re-
spect thereto as shall be reasonably necessary to indicate the effect of such action
on the Common Stock and the number and kind of any other shares of stock which
will comprise a Stock Unit, and the purchase price or prices thereof, after giving
effect to any adjustment which will be required as a result of such action, and
shall cause copies of such notice to be mailed (by first class mail postage prepaid)
to each holder of a Warrant at his last address as shown on the books of the
Company maintained by the Warrant Agent. Such notice shall be so delivered and
mailed in the case of any action covered by Clause (a) or (b) above at least 20 days
prior to the record date for determining holders of the Common Stock for pur-
poses of such action, and in the case of any other such action, at least 20 days
prior to the date of the taking of such proposed action or the date of participation
therein by the holders of Common Stock, whichever shall be earlier.
Copy on file in The University of Chicago Law Review office.
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security holders have been given an opportunity to share in the benefits
of such an unusual event and that if they fail to take advantage of the
opportunity they should no longer be accorded any further protection
against this type of contingency. However, in effect this shortens the
period during which the holder of the convertible security may retain
his option to convert at the same value ratios and subjects him to
forced conversion upon such events instead of preserving his conver-
sion right through the adjustment machinery of the anti-dilution clause.
D. Issuance of Options, Rights, Warrants and Convertible Securities
Another type of corporate action which gives great difficulty and is
variously handled in anti-dilution clauses is the issuance of options,
rights, warrants or other convertible securities25 calling for the delivery
of underlying shares at a price lower than the specified conversion
price. Some anti-dilution clauses make no adjustment of the conversion
price until the underlying shares are actually issued; they are then
treated as stock sold below the conversion price with the price received
upon their issuance being the aggregate of the initial option cost, if any,
plus the exercise price subsequently received. Other anti-dilution
clauses recognize the fact that the issuance of such calls adversely affects
the market for underlying securities by creating the possibility that
additional underlying shares will be issued at a reduced price; the
potential existence of a large block of lower priced shares overhanging
the market constitutes a threat to the existing price of the underlying
shares and often causes it to be reduced.
Consequently, partly to discourage the issuance of such calls upon
underlying shares at reduced prices and partly to provide for appro-
priate adjustment in conversion price, many anti-dilution clauses
provide that the issuance of such calls shall be treated, for purposes of
adjusting the conversion price, as if the underlying shares involved
had immediately been issued at the exercise price stipulated in the
call. It is generally provided that if the calls expire without being
exercised there shall be a corresponding readjustment to nullify the
prior adjustment. The mere issuance of calls could injure the converti-
ble security holder by adversely affecting the market price of the under-
lying securities and, correspondingly, of the convertible securities. Such
an immediate conversion price adjustment upon the issuance of the
calls is almost the only provision in the customary anti-dilution clause
which depends upon market price effect as its justification.
25 Options, rights to purchase stock, stock warrants, and other classes of convertible
securities all have a similar effect for purposes of possible dilution in connection with
convertible securities. Unless otherwise indicated by the context, they will all, in the in-
terest of brevity, be referred to as "calls."
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The issuance of such calls, although they may affect the market,
will not have as significant or as large a dilutionary effect as the actual
exercise of the call at the lower price. Although the provision for an
adjustment upon the issuance of a call and a later reverse readjustment
if it is not exercised is designed to protect the convertible security
holder from the dilution discussed above, it also may give rise to
anomalous and sometimes unfair effects. Let us suppose that in the
event of the issuance of a large block of calls at 50% of the current con-
version price, the particular clause in question provides that the conver-
sion price will immediately be adjusted downward. If the holder of the
convertible security thereupon converts at the lowered conversion price
and the call subsequently expires without exercise, the convertible
security holder has been granted a windfall at the expense of the under-
lying shareholder by receiving additional shares through an adjust-
ment based on a contingency which did not occur. On the other hand,
a convertible holder who delays his conversion until the call has been
exercised will receive an increased number of underlying shares and
a convertible holder w ho waits until the call has expired without
exercise will not receive any increase in the number of underlying
shares whose market price has presumably been unaffected by the
issuance of the call. An anti-dilution clause which would prevent this
kind of unfairness, though excessively complicated, might provide
that the conversion price be adjusted upon the issuance of the call,
with the additional shares prescribed by this change in the conversion
price being held in escrow to be delivered upon the exercise of the
call but to be cancelled in the event it expired without exercise. This
would grant the convertible security holder protection against the
change in market price during the period when the call was outstand-
ing but would prevent him from receiving the windfall represented
by an adjustment against a sale of shares which never occurred.26
26 A related problem, which arises particularly in connection with single options or
single warrants to purchase substantial numbers of shares, is whether a reduction in price
pursuant to an anti-dilution clause is the only remedy which the holder of the convertible
security or the call is entitled to have. If, for example, the anti-dilution clause provides
that the issuance of a certain number of shares at a price below the conversion price shall
cause a downward adjustment in the price at which the option or call is exercisable, and
such an issuance does in fact trigger the price reduction, is the purchaser entitled not only
to buy the underlying shares at the adjusted price but also to purchase an increased
number of shares at the adjusted price sufficient to let the purchaser continue to buy a
stipulated portion of the outstanding shares equivalent to the proportion which he would
have had had there not been additional issuance of shares which triggered off the price
reduction? In other words, does the holder of such an instrument bargain not only for a
reduced price but also for something analogous to preemptive rights which enable him
to maintain a specific proportion of the shares of the company if he exercises this right to
purchase?
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E. Mergers
Another situation which the cutomary anti-dilution clause does not
handle effectively is the combination of one corporation with another
where convertible securities are outstanding. These combinations have
become increasingly frequent and more important in recent years. The
customary clause usually provides in general terms that the right of
conversion shall be protected in the event of such combination. This
works suitably if the corporation which has issued convertible securi-
ties is merged into a corporation which has outstanding only common
stock or several classes of nonconvertible stock. It also works suitably
if the issuing corporation is the surviving corporation in a merger with
a corporation that has no convertible securities and no unusual classes
of securities senior to its common shares. However, where the terms of
a merger provide, for example, that the holders of convertible securities
shall receive a new security with a modified conversion privilege or
where the other corporation party to the combination has outstanding
convertible securities which have a different conversion price, the effec-
tiveness of the standard clause is open to question. Probably the only
way that such a clause can operate effectively is by requiring the parties
to a combination to work out in good faith a new arrangement which
makes appropriate adjustments. However, in the more involved forms
of corporate combination, such as the sale of 40% of the assets of Cor-
poration A to Corporation B for common stock of B followed by the
merger of Corporation A into Corporation C, the ordinary "boilerplate"
merger provisions of an anti-dilution clause amount to little more
than the convertible's prayer for fair play. Perhaps a court would inter-
vene to prevent gross injustice, but the clause is usually so general in the
face of so many possible variations of corporate combination that it
does not yield predictable results and in fact is often irrelevant. It
might be worthwhile, when drafting such a clause, to provide that any
questions of the application of the anti-dilution clause upon merger,
consolidation or sale of any substantial portion of the assets shall be
referred for arbitration to a stipulated person or institution who is
given binding authority to make the necessary readjustments. Other-
wise, the problems of drafting a merger provision sufficiently compre-
hensive to deal with the manifold variations in corporate combinations
are almost impossible to cope with, except by providing that the parties
shall agree in the future upon "fair" adjustments. Of course, the conver-
tible security holders may elect to convert before the merger takes place
and thus assure that they will be treated similarly to the holders of the
underlying securities.
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F. Escalation
Many anti-dilution clauses, in order to induce conversion, provide
that the conversion price shall escalate at specific intervals. For example,
an initial price of $10 may rise to $12 at the end of five years and $14
at the end of another five years. This type of simple increase can lead
to problems if there has been any adjustment in conversion price during
the prior period as when the initial conversion price is reduced in the
fourth year from $10 to $8. An automatic increase at the end of the
fifth year to $12 would result in a $4 increase instead of the $2 increase
intended. Consequently, it is better to provide that escalation shall be
made by the addition of a specified number of dollars to the conversion
price in effect at the time when escalation occurs instead of specifying
the new conversion price as an absolute figure to come into effect at
a given moment. Perhaps a better way of dealing with this problem
would be to add to the adjusted conversion price then in effect a pro-
portionate increase which bears to the adjusted price the same ratio as
the stipulated increase bore to the original price, thus preserving the
original proportion arrangements. This preserves for the convertible
security holder the full benefit of any downward adjustments in the
conversion price.
G. Evasion
None of the types of anti-dilution clauses, whether constructed on
the conversion price or the market value formula, is impervious to
evasion. If a corporation which has convertible securities outstanding
chooses deliberately to benefit the common shareholders and to under-
mine the worth of the conversion privilege, there is at least one method
which avoids any adjustment under either the traditional or the market
price clause. The corporation can authorize an intermediate class of
shares, junior to the outstanding convertible securities but with full
preference rights over the underlying common shares so that they could
not be considered common shares. Such intermediate shares could
be endowed with an abnormally high dividend rate and could then be
issued on preemptive rights to common shareholders at an extremely
attractive price. Because they would not be "underlying" shares, their
issuance would not trigger the anti-dilution clause. However, the heavy
diversion of earnings to the intermediate shares would diminish the
value of the underlying shares, to the detriment of the holders of con-
vertible securities but not to the detriment of the holders of common
stock who would have bought the new shares on a favorable basis.
It is conceivable that some liberal and forward-looking court might
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enjoin the issuance of such intermediate shares at the instance of a
convertible security holder on the ground that the sale price of the
newly issued shares was grossly disproportionate to intrinsic value.
But this is highly unlikely since the common shareholders would have
no objection to the sale. Moreover, such action would have to be based
on the common law rather than on an express provision of the anti-
dilution clause. Some measure of protection against this kind of evasion
might be afforded by a provision in an anti-dilution clause requiring
that the holders of convertible securities be given notice of any corpo-
rate action which adversely affects the securities deliverable upon con-
version. Thus the holders of convertible securities could effect con-
version prior to the effective date of such adverse action. Occasionally,
an anti-dilution clause contains a catch-all provision to the effect that,
if any corporate action shall be taken which has not been dealt with
specifically in the anti-dilution clause but which has an adverse effect
upon the right of conversion, some appropriate adjustment as deter-
mined by an independent firm of attorneys or accountants shall be
made in the conversion price. It would seem clearly desirable from
the convertible security holder's viewpoint that a provision of this
general nature be included in anti-dilution clauses more frequently
or indeed that it become standard "boilerplate" in such clauses.27
27 For example:
In case at any time or from time to time conditions arise by reason of action
taken by the Company, which in the opinion of the Board of Directors, are not
adequately covered by the provisions of this Article Four, and which might
materially and adversely affect the conversion rights of the Debenture holders,
the Board of Directors shall appoint a firm of independent certified public ac-countants of recognized standing, who may be the firm regularly retained by theCompany, who shall give their opinion upon the adjustment, if any, on a basis
consistent with the standards established in the other 
provisions of this Article
F ur, necessary with respect to the Conversion Price, so as to preserve, without
dilution, the conversion rights of the Debenture holders. Upon receipt of such
opinion, the Board of Directors shall forthwith make the adjustments described
therein.
Copy on file in The University of Chicago Law Review office. Would not a more suitably
objective approach be to have the accountants described in the above section appointed
by the trustee or by a specified percentage of security holders rather than by the board
of directors of the company? The clause might also call for an adjustment in conversion
price whenever a corporate action through readjustment of capital or issuance of new
shares modifies the rights of common shareholders to participate or share in the earnings
of the company.
It is probably accurate to say that the desire to participate in the earnings of the com-
pany and to maintain a specified ratio of participation in earnings is the prime motiva-
tion for the convertible security holder's investment and the primary reason behind the
anti-dilution clause. It could be argued that the major purpose of the anti-dilution clause
is not only to guard the ratio of shares delivered but more importantly to assure an an-
ticipated participation in earnings; therefore, the possibility that an intermediate class
of diversionary preferred stock will be inserted or that similar insidious devices will be
used should be forestalled by a general provision for adjustments in conversion ratio upon
any change in the ratio of participation in earnings by the underlying shares deliverable
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As a matter of remedy, the interposition of an intermediate class
of preferred stock with characteristics designed to circumvent the
purposes of the anti-dilution clause might possibly be attacked by the
convertible security holder through an action under that increasingly
ubiquitous panacea, rule 10b-5, 28 on the ground that such conduct
constitutes a "scheme to defraud ... in connection with the ... sale
of securities." This possibility is worthy of cognizance because there is
an offering of shares pursuant to preemptive rights and hence a "sale"
of securities. However, it is extremely doubtful whether the courts
would or should apply rule lob-5 to such a situation, particularly be-
cause the convertible security holder would be neither a purchaser
nor a seller of the intermediate class of securities, and also because there
would be no reliance upon a fraudulent misrepresentation. 29
upon conversion. If conversion price adjustment were geared only into earnings participa-
tion to protect against interposing an intermediate class of securities with an inordinate
participation in earnings, a similar type of evasion could be attempted by giving a normal
share in earnings to the newly created intermediate class of securities, with exaggerated
voting rights or an overly generous treatment upon liquidation or upon merger or con-
solidation. Consequently, it would seem that the better way to deal with the possibility
of the insertion of an intermediate class of securities would be pursuant to some general
treatment rather than merely by gearing adjustment into inroads upon earnings.
28 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949), promulgated by authority of § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
29 In addition to the importance to this problem of § 10(b), there are also a number
of complex problems of liability under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
which grow out of the question whether conversion of a convertible security is an outright
sale or a purchase of the security deliverable upon such conversion under the meaning of
§ 16(b). See, e.g., Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831 (D.N.J. 1963), rev'd in part,
34 U.S.L. WVEEK 2192 (3d Cir. Oct. 1, 1965); 19 RuTGrs L. REv. 151 (1964). See generally
2 Loss, SEcuRrrms REGULATION 1066-75 (2d ed. 1961). As an example of the oblique way in
which the impact of the anti-dilution clause is likely to be felt, see Blau v. Lamb, 242 F.
Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), appeal docketed, No. 29940, 2d Cir., Aug. 13, 1965, where liability
was asserted against an insider under § 16(b) on the ground that the insider had first ex-
changed his shares of common stock in another corporation for convertible preferred stock
of the issuing corporation and within six months after the first exchange had converted his
preferred stock into common stock. The court held that the initial exchange of another
corporation's common stock for the issuing corporation's convertible preferred was a
purchase of the latter and also that the conversion of the preferred stock into common
stock was a sale of the preferred and a purchase of the common. The court therefore im-
posed liability upon the insider. In connection with the anti-dilution clause the court
stated:
Throughout the protracted history of this litigation, the defendants have em-
phasized the importance of the provision in the preferred certificates which, like
a similar provision attaching to the Ashland Oil securities, protected the preferred
against the diluting effect of any possible split or stock dividend on the common
stock by providing for a proportionate adjustment in the conversion rate. Thus,
defendants argue, the Air-Way preferred was the economic equivalent of the
Air-Way common, and the conversion of the preferred did not interrupt the con-
tinuity of their investment in Air-Way-i.e., the disposition of the preferred by
conversion did not constitute a "sale."
The simple answer to this argument is this anti-dilution feature did not place
the holder of preferred stock in precisely the same investment position as the
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II. COMPARISON OF THE MARKET PRICE CLAUSE AND
TRADITIONAL CLAUSES
The basic tenet of the market price clause is that the holder of the
convertible security should be treated, for purposes of protection against
dilution, as if he were a common shareholder. Thus, this anti-dilution
clause adjusts for splits, combinations, and major stock dividends but
does not adjust for sales of common stock below conversion price unless
the sales confer a benefit upon the common shareholders by giving
them stock below the market price. The sale price's relationship to
conversion price is immaterial.
As an example of the significant difference between the operations
of the two clauses consider a situation in which a security holder has
100 shares of convertible preferred stock which are convertible into
100 shares of common stock at $10 a share. If the issuing corporation
sells to the public another block of common shares equal in number to
the total outstanding shares at the time of the issuance of the convert-
ible preferred stock and at the present market price of $8 per share, the
market price clause will make no adjustment and the 100 shares of con-
vertible preferred stock will continue to be convertible into 100 shares
of common stock. Under the traditional conversion price clause the con-
version price will, on the same set of facts, drop from $10 a share to $9
a share, an average betwe~n the initial conversion price and the new
sales price of $8 per share, and the 100 shares of convertible preferred
stock will then be convertible into approximately Ill shares of common
stock. Assuming conversion, there will be an 11% difference in the op-
eration of the two clauses. This, not an extreme example, illustrates the
results produced by the two types of clauses in a frequently recurring
situation; such variation in results may justify a price differential and
certainly justifies a clear description in the market analysis bulletins
and prospectuses.
holder of common stock. On the contrary, by conversion, Lamb and Enterprises
significantly enhanced their investment position in three important respects:
(1) greater voting power, (2) greater dividends and (3) greater marketability of
their shares ....
On the other hand, in apparent contradiction of his counsel's argument that
the preferred was the economic equivalent of the common, Lamb testified upon
cross examination that, although he knew he was giving up valuable preferences
when he converted, "... I felt I should have the same status as the other stock-
holders .... "
Thus, irrespective of the anti-dilution feature of the preferred, the latter was
simply not the economic equivalent of the common stock. By converting the pre-
ferred, Lamb and Enterprises received a totally different security with an attendant
alteration in the risks and advantages involved. To put this another way, con-
version into common stock required an investment decision based upon wholly
different considerations than those involved in the decision to exchange for the
preferred stock. 242 F. Supp. at 157-58.
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An underlying assumption of the market value approach is that any
sale of common stock for less than market value will probably be a
sale for a good business purpose and one in which the interests of the
holders of common shares and of convertible securities will be iden-
tical.30 If the company needs additional cash and it is necessary to sell
common shares to persons other than present common shareholders at
a disadvantageous price, such a course, it is contended, is for the benefit
of the entire enterprise. Hence common and convertible securities
holders should receive equal treatment. The market price clause thus
recognizes the economic realities which require securities to be sold
on the best terms possible under the particular business conditions
then applicable and does not deter a company from necessary financing
by the sale of common stock when the market price is below the con-
version price. Unlike the traditional clause, it does not subject the issuer
to the unfavorable effect on financing terms caused by downward adjust-
ment of the conversion price and the consequent possibility that the
value of the underlying shares will decrease at some future time
through conversion at the reduced conversion price.
The clause drafted pursuant to the market price formula is simpler
than the traditional clauses, its proponents contend, and has the advan-
tage of dealing with normal, expectable corporate transactions; any
improper conduct or abnormal activity will be prevented by the pro-
hibitions of corporation statutes or by fiduciary restraints under the
common law or securities regulations statutes. 31
30 In a letter to the writer, one of the leading investment banks which has adopted
the market price formula anti-dilution clause stated its reasons as follows:
Briefly, we consider the market price form of anti-dilution clause more realistic
than the conversion price formula as it more closely parallels the protection avail-
able to the common stockholder, which the holder of convertible securities has
the right to become.
-If the company sells additional common stock at a price below the market a
common stockholder who usually has a pre-emptive right to participate in the
sale, may avoid dilution of his investment by either exercising his rights or selling
them. No such avenue is, of course, open to the holder of a convertible security.
However, a similar type of protection may be given him by providing that the
cost of the common stock which he has the right to acquire be adjusted in line
with the discount for market at which the new shares were sold. We feel that
this type of adjustment is more meaningful than adjusting for the sale of stock
below the conversion price.
Letter on file in The University of Chicago Law Review office.
31 The reasons supporting use of the market price formula in preference to the con-
version price formula were set out in a letter from an eminent New York attorney:
Goldman Sachs has for many years prided itself on the shortness and succinct-
ness of its prospectuses and financial documents, believing that this leads to easier
understanding by the investing public and more careful consideration of the sig-
nificance of each provision. Consequently, one of the criteria was to make the
statement of the formula as short as possible but at the same time to retain the
real and practical protections considered necessary. For this reason many of the
contingencies covered in great detail in other statements of anti-dilution formulas,
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Although there is much cogency in the arguments of the proponents
of the market price formula, a number of problems are raised. First,'
the assumption basic to the market price clause that common and con-
vertible shareholders should bear equal risks arguably fails to recognize
the nature of the convertible security and the basis upon which it is
purchased and traded in the financial community. Many, if not most,
convertible securities have temporally limited conversion rights, even
further limited by escalating prices during the lifetime of such rights.
In the case of the convertible debt security, the right terminates on the
maturity date of the security. In the case of convertible stocks, the
right of conversion is often limited to a period of years and is seldom
in effect for the entire period during which the stock may be outstand-
ing. The right is also generally subject to the time limitation growing
out of the power of the issuing company to retire or force conversion
of the convertible security. Consequently, it may be argued that the
holder of convertible securities is more likely to have a short-run con-
but which are less likely to arise as a practical matter, are left to the protection
of basic corporate law or to good faith valuations by the board of directors. An
example of this is that no specific provision is made for an adjustment in the
event of the sale of common stock for less than the current market price to others
than stockholders. Such a sale would lay the directors open to a charge of waste
of corporate assets and, therefore, as a practical matter, such a sale is not likely
to occur. Furthermore, this would also dilute the existing common stock holders,
who presumably elected the directors, and to whom the directors are answerable.
In other words, the interests of the holder of the conversion feature and the
holder of common stock are the same.
The market price formula and the conversion price formula are based on two
entirely different underlying theories. The market price formula is fundamentally
based upon the concept that the holder of the convertible security, in so far as
his conversion feature is concerned, is in the same position as a common stock-
holder. In other words, if the common stockholders receive a benefit, this should
be reflected in the formula. If, on the other hand, the corporate action or recap-
italization is at the expense of the common stockholder, then the stock issuable
upon conversion should bear its share of that expense. To express it more simply,
when the value of the common stock has been lowered by a benefit received by
the common stockholders, the conversion price should be adjusted. Consequently,
there is no dilution adjustment on the issue of additional common stock (other
than by way of split ups, stock dividends, etc.) unless the additional issue has been
offered to the common stockholders at a price less than its current market value.
In this event the formula is calculated to decrease the conversion price in the
proportion that the market value of the stock "cum rights" bears to the market
value of the stock "ex rights."
On the other hand, the underlying theory in the conversion price formula is
that the holder of the convertible security, irrespective of changes in the affairs of
the corporation or the market, is guaranteed an adjustment in the conversion
price whenever common stock is issued for a consideration below the conversion
price and this is true whether or not any benefits were received by the common
stockholders. In other words, as far as the conversion feature is concerned, he is
better off than, not just equal to, a holder of common stock. The adjusted con-
version price under this formula is calculated by multiplying the number of com-
*mon shares previously outstanding by the conversion price, then adding the value
received for the additional shares issued and dividing that sum by the number of
shares then outstanding. Usually an adjustment is made only if the conversion
price would thereby be decreased. However, in some instances the formula has
provided for adjustments in the case of increases but this is not true in many cases.
Letter on file in The University of Chicago Law Review office.
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cept of his investment than is the common stockholder; hence it may
not be sufficient or appropriate to regard him as a common stockholder
or to put him in a position where his interest can be diluted merely
because of a price change in the stock market.
Second, if there is any misconduct of the kind which this clause
leaves to be guarded by the restraints of general corporate law, it is
not always certain that the holder of convertible securities will be in
a position to institute a suit to enjoin such misconduct or to reverse
it. For instance, if the complainant holds convertible debt securities,
is he entitled to enforce corporate restraints generally thought to be
designed for the benefit of shareholders only? If he holds convertible
preferred shares, can he bring a derivative suit to restrain a corporate
wrong currently affecting only common shareholders, or must he bring
an action for damages in which he must bear the difficult burden of
showing individual harm?
Third, the difficult problem of proving a deviation from market
price in sales to common shareholders, which would be necessary for
the convertible security holder to protect himself in a disputed situa-
tion, is a deterrent to suits under the market price clause. Assuming
that all questions of standing to sue have been resolved in favor of
the holder of convertible securities and that he wishes to challenge
the fairness of the price, the burden would lie upon such holder either
to enjoin an issuance of the underlying stock at a proposed price
which is allegedly below the market or to obtain a judicial declara-
tion that a sale of underlying stock previously made had actually been
made at a price below market, and therefore that the conversion price
should be revised. In the case of the small closed or private corpora-
tions, where convertible securities are often used as a means of obtain-
ing senior investment capital, proving whether a sale is at or below
market would be almost impossible, due to the nonexistence of any
real market with respect to the securities of such a corporation. There-
fore, the market price clause will probably find little or no acceptance
in the convertible securities issued by small or closed corporations or
by corporations whose outstanding securities have a limited market.
Problems of proving market price of securities traded over the counter
would also be far from inconsequential. Securities in the over-the-
counter market tend to trade with a substantial difference between
the bid and the asked. What then is the appropriate market price for
the purposes of this anti-dilution clause: the bid price; the asked price;
the price at which securities are actually traded, if that is ascertainable;
or the mean between the bid and the asked? In the absence of a specific
provision in the anti-dilution clause, any choice from these alternatives
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would be arbitrary. Even with respect to securities listed on a national
securities exchange, the market price clause must still define when the
market price is relevant to the clause. Even given a date, the price for
a listed security might be the opening price for the day, the closing
price, the day's high, or the day's low. Presumably the purpose of the
market value clause is to provide a price which is unaffected by the
price at which the stock is to be offered to stockholders in the rights
offering. If this is the case, then the market price must be taken at a
time before there has been any announcement of the rights offering
price. However, any person experienced in corporate finance will rec-
ognize that the actual announcement of the price of a rights offering
will almost always be preceded by speculation. and discussion of prob-
able price and may often be preceded by "leaks," intentional or in-
evitable, with respect to the price. Hence, the selection of a truly
unaffected trading period and market price will be quite difficult.
Fourth, the market price clause deprives the convertible security
holder of some windfalls, in the form of increased amounts of shares
deliverable upon conversion, which have been built into the traditional
conversion price clauses. It might be urged that the investor in converti-
ble securities, who is seeking the best of both possible worlds of security
and equity growth, has come to expect these "traditional" boons and
that this expectation is reflected in the market prices of convertible se-
curities.32 Whether such implicit understandings should be lightly aban-
doned without fanfare or public notice raises questions of propriety
and fairness.
However difficult may be the problems of computing market price
in connection with sales of common stock to present common stock-
holders, it must further be remembered that the price at which common
stock is sold to persons other than present common stockholders in a
rights offering does not occasion an adjustment of conversion price
under the market price formula, regardless of the price at which such
a sale takes place. 33 It is possible that a sale proposed, without pre-
82 It should be noted that there is one rare circumstance under which the market price
clause will produce benefits for holders of the convertible securities which would not be
obtainable under the standard conversion price clause. Under most conversion price anti-
dilution clauses a sale of underlying stock above initial conversion price but below market
price will have no effect on future conversion price or the number of shares deliverable
upon conversion. However, under the market price clause, if the issuer sells underlying
stock to present stockholders at a price above the initial conversion price but below the
then current market price the conversion price will be adjusted by increasing the number
of shares deliverable upon conversion.
33 It must be recognized that corporations sometimes sell securities to outsiders at un-
favorable prices for various reasons in connection with issuances of stock for property,
attempts to affect control, and various kinds of private placements.
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emptive rights for present stockholders, at a price deemed unfairly
low might be enjoined as inequitable. 34 However, this possibility of
dilution requires the holders of convertible securities to be vigilant in
advance of such sales so that they may block them by injunction. Such
vigilance must be of an extraordinary degree since ordinary corporate
formalities do not require that advance notice of such sales be given
to the holders of convertible securities, particularly debt securities,
unless the anti-dilution clause expressly so provides.
Moreover, the possibility of defeating in whole or in part the effec-
tive protection of the market price clause might be open to any manage-
ment which wished unscrupulously to further the interests of the com-
mon stockholders as against those- of the convertible security holders;
since the board of directors probably regards itself as representing
the common stockholders, the inducement to evade or avoid the re-
strictions of the anti-dilution clause in favor of the common stock-
holders is always very great.35 Let us suppose, for example, that the
conversion price, as well as the market price of underlying common
shares, is $10 a share. The directors cut the dividend on the stock by
50%; the market price then drops from $10 to $8. The directors make
a stock offering upon rights to the present shareholders at the new
market price of $8; in the following year the dividend is restored to
its prior level and the market price returns to $10. The outcome of
this series of events is an actual dilution. By lowering the dividend,
with its predictable market consequences, the representatives of the
common shareholders can reduce- the price for which they can sell
shares to common shareholders without a corresponding adjustment in
the conversion price. It can, of course, be argued that a maneuver done
for the purpose of authorizing a sale at a reduced market price in order
to obviate the impact of the anti-dilution clause should be vulnerable
to legal attack. However, the problem of proving that the dividend
was reduced solely for the purpose of creating a false market and evad-
ing the impact of the anti-dilution clause would be extremely difficult.
The likelihood of success in a suit by holders of the convertible securi-
ties would probably be very slight in view of the roster of corporate
purposes which any astute board of directors could muster to show the
need for conserving cash and the courts' general unwillingness to
scrutinize carefully directors' business purposes. 6
34 Cf. Bodell v. Grand Gas & Elec. Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 119, 131, 132 Atl. 442, 447 (Ch.
1926) (dictum), aff'd, 15 Del. Ch. 420, 140 Ad. 264 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
35 See, e.g., Goldman v. Postal Tel., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1943).
36 See, e.g., Barnes v. Andrews, 298 Fed. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Burkhart v. Smith, 161
Md. 398, 157 At. 299 (1931); Ucello v. Golden Foods, Inc., 325 Mass. 319, 90 N.E.2d 530
(1950); Murphy v. Hanlon, 322 Mass. 683, 686, 79 N.E.2d 292, 293-94 (1948).
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Similarly, without revision of the conversion price a board of direc-
tors might be able to take advantage of fortuitous temporary market
dips to favor common shareholders. For example, the board of directors
of a company which had an especially fine earnings record and extraor-
dinary prospects could have decided during a market decline following
such an event as President Eisenhower's heart attack or President
Kennedy's assassination that the cause of the major market drop was
temporary in effect. The board might then make an offering of common
stock to common stockholders at the new low prices during the period
of the depressed market. When the market price is restored after an
interval of market adjustment, the net result would be dilution of
the convertible security holder's interests against which anti-dilution
clauses are normally expected to protect. Of course, it may be said
that the willingness of the common shareholders to gamble upon the
return of the market to its previous level is an act of faith or good
judgment in the face of uncertainty which merits financial reward.
However, the risk borne by the common stockholders is minimal in
the case of a general but foreseeable temporary market retreat caused
by an occurrence extrinsic to the internal affairs of the issuing corpo-
ration.
Drafters of the market price clauses are cognizant of these possibili-
ties of maneuver and by the definition of market price contained in
their clauses have sought to block some of the obvious loopholes. The
following is typical of such provisions:
For the purpose of any computation . the current market
price per share of Common Stock at any date shall be deemed
to be the average of the daily closing prices for the thirty
consecutive business days commencing forty-five business days
before the day in question. The closing price for each day
shall be the last reported sales price regular way, or, in case
no such reported sale takes place on such day, the average of
the reported closing bid and asked prices regular way, in
either case on the New York Stock Exchange, or, if the Com-
mon Stock is not listed or admitted to trading on such Ex-
change, on the principal national securities exchange on which
the Common Stock is listed or admitted to trading, or if not
listed or admitted to trading on any national securities ex-
change, the average of the closing bid and asked prices as fur-
nished by any New York Stock Exchange firm selected from
time to time by the Company for the purpose.
However, such a clause does not resolve the problem of the absence
of any market for the stock of the closed corporation nor does it suc-
[Vol. 33:1
1965] Anti-Dilution Clauses
cessfully prevent the company from causing the market price to be
reduced by dividend cuts or other action of similar impact. It merely
prevents the company from using a very temporary change in market
price as the basis of an offering price to shareholders; even in such a
situation it should be noted that the temporarily reduced price during
the computation period will have the effect of depressing the average
price used for the anti-dilution clause. Moreover, this provision leaves
unsolved the problem of the appropriate price to stockholders when
the price of the issuers' stock is sharply rising. Since the quoted formula
is computed on market performance for the average of the thirty days
preceding fifteen days before the date of the sale to common share-
holders, in a rapidly rising stock market such a computation could
work serious injustice on the holders of convertible securities merely
by reason of the price lag.
One would think, in light of these difficulties, that a convertible
security which contains a traditional conversion price clause should be
of greater value to the convertible security holder and should according-
ly sell at a higher price than a comparable convertible security contain-
ing a market price clause.37 Such a price differential should follow
37 Similarly, the prospectuses used to describe sales of convertible securities which have
different types of anti-dilution clauses should clearly differ from one another. At present
prospectuses for convertible securities generally include, at best, cryptic statements which
reveal the differences between anti-dilution clauses only if read with care and penetration
by financially sophisticated purchasers. For an example of a description of anti-dilution
provisions see the following statement in the prospectus relating to 4% convertible sub-
ordinated debentures of Celanese Corporation of America dated March 17, 1965, at page
20, on file in The University of Chicago Law Review office:
Such conversion price is subject to adjustment under a formula in certain
events, including issuance of Common Stock for a consideration less than the con-
version price, Common Stock dividends amounting to 5% or less of the out-
standing shares, and other dividends not in cash out of earned surplus (with
credit under the formula for sales of Common Stock above the conversion price)
and is subject to automatic proportionate adjustment if the Common Stock is
subdivided or combined or in case of Common Stock dividends of more than 5%.
Even this description is more extensive and specific than is customarily found in pro-
spectuses. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. Compare with this a prospectus filed
with the Secretary of State of Canada in accordance with the provisions of the Companies
Act of Canada and not to be used in connection with offerings in the United States. That
prospetcus states: "The indenture pursuant to which the convertible debentures 1989
series will be issued includes provisions for adjustment of the conversion privilege in cer-
tain events." In the body of the prospectus it also states, at greater length than is customary
in the United States:
The 1964 supplemental debenture indenture contains provisions to the effect
that, in the event of (a) any reduction in the number of common shares of the
company due to consolidation thereof, or (b) any increase in the number of such
common shares outstanding due to subdivision thereof, a proportionate adjustment
shall be made in the number of common shares of the company issuable pursuant
to such conversion privilege subsequent to any such change in the number of
outstanding common shares becoming effective. The 1964 supplemental debenture
indenture also contains other provisions to the effect that if the company at any
time after September 3, 1964, issues or sells (with certain exceptions set forth
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even if, as contended by proponents of the market price clause, such
a clause is sounder, more realistic and more desirable. So far as
I am able to ascertain, there are no statistics available which indi-
cate the comparable prices of convertible securities containing these
different kinds of clauses; however, the result of inquiries made to
date leads me to believe that the market does not draw any sophis-
ticated price distinctions between convertible securities based upon
differences in the type of anti-dilution clause which the securities
contain. This leads me to infer not only that the general investing
public has failed to realize that there is any distinction between the
various types of clauses but also that most persons in the investment
business are either unaware of the distinction or attribute no practical
significance to it.38
in the 1964 supplemental debenture indenture) common shares at a price differ-
ent from the conversion price in effect immediately prior to the issuance of such
common shares, or issues any common shares on the exercise of rights to sub-
scribe for or warrants to purchase common shares, or of any options for the
purchase of common shares or on conversion of any securities (other than con-
vertible debentures 1988 series and the convertible income notes) (convertible
into or exchangeable for common shares) and the consideration per share for
which common shares were issued -pursuant to such rights, warrants, options or
convertible or exchangeable securities is in any case less than the said conversion
price in effect immediately prior to the issuance of such common shares, the con-
version price referred to shall be adjusted (in the manner set forth in the 1964
supplemental debenture indenture) so as to protect the conversion privilege of the
convertible debentures 1989 series against dilution.
Copy on file in The University of Chicago Law Review office. The anti-dilution clause to
which the Canadian prospectus refers substantially follows the form of the customary
conversion price formula commonly in use in the United States.
Contrast with the above a clause contained in a prospectus which refers to a market
price anti-dilution clause as follows:
The conversion rate is subject to adjustment on certain events, including the
issuance of stock of the company as a stock dividend; subdivisions, combinations
and reclassifications of the Company's Common Stock; the issuance to holders
of Common Stock of rights or warrants to subscribe for Common Stock at less
than the current market price as defined for the purpose; or the distribution
to holders of Common Stock of evidences of indebtedness, assets (excluding cash
dividends to the extent permitted by Section 4.6 of the indenture summarized
above under "certain restrictions"), a right to subscribe other than those mentioned
above.
Copy on file in The University of Chicago Law Review office.
38 The following excerpt from a letter written by a large and presumably knowledgeable
purchaser of securities who specializes in convertibles affords an example of market
reaction; even less awareness of differences between such clauses can be inferred on the
part of less sophisticated professional securities dealers and certainly in the case of
nonprofessional investors:
This is in answer to your letter of January 18, 1965, regarding our practices
and views on the anti-dilution clauses of convertible securities. We do not make
any precise market adjustment because of anti-dilution clauses, i.e. no formula is
used, but we do take such clauses into account in determining the attractiveness
of the security.
Basically what we expect from an anti-dilution clause is to allow the convertible
holder to participate with the common shareholder in any adjustments that
would affect a shareholder of common stock. Generally such adjustments would
be the same as those that would result in a change in the per share tax cost
basis as determined for Federal Income Tax purposes. (While there is no direct
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III. CONCLUSION
The anti-dilution clause is an integral and necessary part of any
convertible security. The clause is a complex, difficult and intriguing
exercise in corporate draftsmanship. It requires the draftsman to pro-
tect against the whole gamut of potential corporate rearrangement or
manipulation which might adversely affect the rights of the holders of
the convertible securities. So intricate and precise an instrument should
be prepared with the greatest care and diligence.
There is great variance among the different types of anti-dilution
clauses now in use. Some are prepared on the basis of terms imposed
by the investor in convertible securities, so as to provide him with the
utmost advantage which can be exacted under the circumstances. Other
anti-dilution clauses are intentionally lenient, to minimize the issuers'
burden of conversion as much as possible. Still other anti-dilution
clauses attempt an evenhanded compromise of the different possible
positions. There seems to be no really consistent theoretical thread
running through these clauses that is based upon a single enunciated
basic principle or objective. If, for example, the clause is designed
to protect the market value of the securities deliverable upon exer-
cise, it is inadequately and incompletely effected. To speak of protect-
ing the right of conversion 'begs the question; in the absence of a
precise theory one cannot know precisely what the "right of conver-
sion" entails.
The market price theory comes closest to providing a coherent and
consistent theory for the drafting of anti-dilution clauses. However,
at least in public issues of securities, this theory entails so great a modi-
fication of the rights traditionally accorded to the convertible security
holder by the usual conversion price anti-dilution clause that the value
of the security itself should be affected. The symmetry of the market
price theory does not necessarily outweigh the desirability of adjusting
the conversion price upon the issuance of common stock below con-
version price; refraining from adjustment in such a contingency de-
prives the convertible security holder of the benefit of the protection
relationship between tax costs and anti-dilution clauses, the philosophy behind
determining adjustments to either one would appear to be the same.) ....
You mention that Goldman Sachs and some other underwriters are taking the
position that the anti-dilution clauses should not include adjustments for sale
of common stock below the conversion price. Although as a buyer of convertible
securities I would like to receive every possible benefit, I fail to see the logical
reasoning for an adjustment in such cases. Such sales do not create anything of
value that the common shareholder may dispose of so that under the philosophy
of "riding along with the shareholder" the bondholder should probably not
benefit when the common shareholder does not. The bondholder would presume
that the offering of stock is being made for the general good of the company and
all its shareholders.
Letter on file in The University of Chicago Law Review office.
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against the risks assumed by the common shareholder admittedly pro-
vided by the traditional conversion price clause. If it can be said that an
investor in convertible securities bargains for immunity against those
very risks and for a conversion price which guarantees a particular ratio
upon conversion of the common stock, then he is entitled to be pro-
tected against the very vicissitudes which the market price type of clause
imposes upon him.
It is essential that the parties to the transaction be aware of the
numerous possibilities open to the draftsman of the anti-dilution clause
if the resultant bargain, whatever its final form, is to be an informed
one. The terms of the anti-dilution clause must be recognized as
significant and, above all, as negotiable.39
39 See, for a most interesting report on the American Bar Foundation's endeavors in
this area, Rogers, The Corporate Trust Indenture Profect, 20 Bus. LAw. 551, 562 (1965).
The basic objective of the project appears to have been the preparation of "boilerplate"
sections of a corporate trust indenture which could be incorporated by reference into
a shorter instrument which embodies the particular negotiated terms of a specific deal.
Id. at 562 ("The first task is to separate the boilerplate from the negotiable provisions.").
The project found that while some provisions were clearly negotiable and others were
clearly standard boilerplate, many others occupied an uncertain status in between. Id. at
563. Interestingly, an early version of the Model Provision contained a boilerplate anti-
dilution clause which was not contained in the final draft. Under the analysis advanced in
this article it is apparent that anti-dilution clauses should be classified as negotiable;
hence I am pleased to see that the Model Provisions in their final form do not treat
them as standard.
